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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The October 2005 Schools White Paper, “Higher Standards, Better 
Schools for All”1 set out a series of reforms designed to raise standards 
and equity throughout the school system through a combination of 
greater autonomy for schools, diversity of provision, more innovation, 
choice & contestability and parental engagement. The White Paper 
reforms were principally built on the evidence and experience of what 
has worked in the UK. Particular lessons were learnt from the successes 
of specialist schools, the academies program, the governance 
arrangements of voluntary-aided and foundation schools; and policies 
to tackle failure.  
 
2. The government is also aware that many other countries have 
experience of school reform. This paper sets out some of that evidence. 
It focuses on European and Anglo-Saxon countries that have introduced 
significant educational reforms in the past couple of decades or are 
currently introducing reforms. It does not consider lessons from high 
performing countries like Japan and South Korea because of cultural 
differences, or less developed countries that have introduced choice 
reforms like Chile, though there are obviously lessons to be learnt from 
them. The paper looks at the experiences of Sweden, the USA, New 
Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Finland.  
 
3. For each country, the paper: 
• describes the context in which its education system operates; 
• reviews the main features of its school system; 
• discusses recent reforms; and 
• reviews the available evidence on the impacts of reforms on key 
outcomes, including educational standards and equity. 
 
4. The most important conclusion drawn from the international evidence 
on school reform, and particularly reforms to extend parental choice, is 
the importance of getting the detailed system design conditions right. 
This is a finding of work on public service reform more generally.2 Under 
the right conditions, extending parental choice can raise educational 
standards, promote innovation, encourage greater responsiveness to 
parents’ and pupils’ preferences and promote equity. However, poorly 
                                            
1 Higher Standards, Better Schools For All, DfES, 2005. CM 6677. 
2 The UK Government’s Approach to Public Service Reform – A Discussion Paper, Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit, June 2006 – available at www.strategy.gov.uk 
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designed reforms may favour the better off and may also lead to 
increased segregation of social and ethnic groups. 
 
5. For choice-based systems to be successful in raising educational 
standards for all: 
• parents – particularly parents of disadvantaged children – need to be 
provided with high quality information, guidance and advice about 
the options open to them; 
• help with the costs of making choices, such as covering the costs of 
transport to alternative schools, should be provided for those who 
need it; 
• schools should be prevented from “cream skimming” (selecting the 
cheapest to teach or most able to learn) by putting in place funding 
regimes that reflect the higher costs of teaching some groups and by 
using regulation and statutory guidance to prevent unfair selection;. 
The experience of New Zealand shows the importance of regulating 
the over-subscription criteria schools can use e.g. through a code of 
admissions, to provide an incentive to improve teaching and learning 
rather than just improving intakes; and 
• above all, early effective action should be taken to tackle failing or 
poorly performing schools and increase the supply of good schools. 
Ultimately, the greatest safeguard against adverse effects on social 
inequalities and segregation is to make sure there are more good 
schools. Choice, the removal of barriers both to the expansion of 
good existing schools and the entry of good new schools to the 
system, and other reforms all have a role to play in this – with funding 
following parental choices so good performers are rewarded and can 
expand, and poor performers penalised. Evidence from Milwaukee 
suggests that where schools face no financial implications from not 
attracting pupils there is only a limited behavioural response to 
choice.   
 
6. These lessons have informed the reforms in the Education and 
Inspections Bill 2006. These reforms include: 
• increasing the ability of all parents to choose effectively, through 
dedicated choice advisers to help the least well-off parents and better 
information for all parents when their child enters primary and 
secondary school; 
• help with the costs of making choice for those who need it, though 
extending the right to free school transport for children from poorer 
families to their three nearest secondary schools within a six mile 
radius;  
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• additional funding for targeted one-to-one tuition in English and 
maths in the schools with the most underperforming pupils, to help 
those falling behind to catch up with their peers; 
• making it easier for schools to introduce banding into their 
admissions policies and strengthening the admissions code to 
prevent cream skimming; 
• a new role for local authorities, commissioning rather than providing 
education, to support parents’ choices and diversity of provision; 
• enabling successful and popular schools to expand or federate; 
closing schools that are failing or fail to improve; and running 
competitions for the provision of new schools; and 
• enabling all schools to acquire self-governing Trust status, giving 
them greater freedoms to work with new partners and to collaborate 
with other schools, whilst remaining within the strong accountability 
framework that all schools face. 
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2. SWEDEN 
 
Summary 
 
• Sweden is a relatively small, homogenous country, with high levels of 
educational attainment and equity. 
 
• Since the reforms in 1992, Swedish parents have had the right to choose 
between state-operated schools and state-funded independent schools. 
Barriers to entry for new schools are low, within a framework of fair 
funding and admissions. 
 
• There has followed a significant entry of state-funded independent 
schools. Parental satisfaction is very high, with 90% of parents now in 
favour of having a choice over which school their child attends.  
Innovative organisations have entered the school system and large 
“chains” of schools have emerged. 
 
• Lack of standardised achievement data makes quantification of the 
impact on standards hard, but studies have found mathematics grades in 
government-operated schools have improved fastest in areas where 
there has been greater entry of independent schools into the state 
sector. 
 
• There is no firm evidence on the impact of the reforms on segregation or 
equity. But a decade after the reforms, Sweden is one of the least ability-
segregated school systems in the OECD.  In areas where parents have 
been encouraged to choose by their local authority and given support 
and information to help them do so, the least well-off do appear to take 
advantage of the choices they have. 
 
Context 
 
7. Sweden is a small country with a population of around 9 million, of 
which 1.6 million are aged 0-14. Population density is low with 20 people 
per square kilometre: only 8% of the population density in the UK. 
Sweden has a relatively homogeneous population with few ethnic 
minorities. Income inequality is relatively low with the Gini coefficient in 
Sweden being 0.24 compared to 0.33 in the UK.3  
                                            
3 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
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8. In general, Sweden performs well on international education tests.4 
Headline results show it is in the top third of OECD countries for the 
mean performance of children in reading literacy and about average for 
performance in maths.  
 
9. The impact of socio-economic status on results is relatively low, 
particularly in reading literacy. There also appears to be very little 
segregation by ability between schools, with only Iceland having lower 
variation between the average performance of different schools in 
reading literacy. Further details on the performance of countries in 
international tests can be found in the appendix. 
 
The Swedish education system and reforms5 
 
10. Prior to 1990, the Swedish school system was heavily centralised, with 
high Central Government involvement in the day-to-day running of 
schools through a National Board of Education which had financial and 
regulatory control and implemented a heavily prescriptive national 
curriculum. 
 
11.  All children attended the school that the Government allocated them 
to, based on a ‘catchment area’ system. The only choice that parents 
exercised over which school their child attended was through choice 
over which area they lived in. 
 
12. The early 1990s saw two key reforms: increasing local autonomy over 
education policy; and increasing the choices offered to parents over the 
school that their child attended. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
4 Data used for international comparisons from PISA 2000. This is because there is no internationally 
comparable data for England in PISA 2003 due to low response rates. However the general conclusions 
about the performance of each country in this review do not alter substantially between PISA 2000 and 
2003. Further details about international tests can be found in the appendix. 
5 For an overview of reforms, see “School choice works! The case of Sweden” – Bergström and 
Sandström – School Choice Issues 1(1), Friedman Foundation (2002a) 
[http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/resources/swedenstudy0103.pdf] 
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Increasing school autonomy and transferring responsibility to local 
government 
 
13. In 1991, responsibility for schools was transferred to local 
government, giving it more autonomy over the organisation of the local 
school system: 
• financial resources began to be distributed to schools through 
local government; 
• the national curriculum was made significantly less prescriptive; 
and 
• Central government’s role was scaled back to monitoring, 
evaluating and inspecting schools, providing information and 
researching and spreading good practice. 
 
Giving parents more choice 
 
14. The 1991 Act on Freedom of Choice and Independent Schools 
extended the choices offered to parents over which school their child 
attended. The Act, which came into force in 1992, compelled local 
authorities to give state funding to independent schools, providing they 
were licensed by the National Agency of Education (NAE): 
• initially the level of funding was set at 85% of average per-student 
spending in each local authority. Independent schools were 
allowed to charge a small fee to make up the difference; and 
• in 1997, local authorities were given a new duty to fund 
independent schools on “the same basis as funds are allocated 
between public schools in the local authority”. This was combined 
with making the charging of top-up fees by independent schools 
illegal. 
 
15. The 1991 Act also introduced a new duty on local authorities to allow 
parental choices between government-operated schools – provided 
there was sufficient existing capacity in the school of the parent’s 
choice: 
• However, the way this is generally interpreted by local authorities 
is that parents should be given a choice only if they actively 
disagree with their child’s allocation to their ‘catchment area’ 
school. Limited support is given to encouraging parental choice in 
many areas of Sweden6. 
                                            
6 A survey of local authorities in 2002 found that only half had even discussed school choice, mainly due 
to the fact that choice is infeasible for many parents as Sweden is a highly rural country – see “School 
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The key features of the Swedish reforms 
 
Licensing of new independent schools 
 
16. Independent schools are only allowed to enter the school system if 
they are licensed by the National Agency of Education. To obtain a 
license they must meet a number of criteria:7 
• follow the national curriculum and work in line with national 
educational targets; 
• be open to all, regardless of ability, religion or ethnic origin; 
• be open to inspection by the NAE and the local authority; 
• demonstrate there at least 20 students willing to attend the school; 
• demonstrate they have sufficient funding to start-up (no financial 
support is given to independent schools to support start up); 
• not charge any tuition fees; and 
• follow regulations on teaching staff, the type of people who can 
run a school etc. 
 
17. Local authorities are allowed – and often do – appeal against the 
opening of new independent schools, although they have no powers to 
veto new entry. In the event of an appeal, the NAE makes a judgement 
based on whether there is “evidence that creation of a new school will 
have long-term negative consequences for the local public school 
system”. However few appeals are accepted by the NAE. For example, in 
2000, of 138 applications for new primary/lower secondary schools that 
were not withdrawn, only 2 were rejected due to concerns of the local 
authority.8 
 
18. Acceptable admissions criteria that licensed independent schools in 
Sweden can use in the event of over-subscription are:9 
• catchment area; 
• presence of siblings in the school; and 
• date parents applied to the school (waiting lists). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
choice and its effects in Sweden: A summary” – National Agency of Education Report 230 (2003) 
http://www.skolverket.se/publikationer?id=1204 
7 Source: correspondence with National Agency of Education officials 
8 Bergström and Sandström (2002a) 
9 Source: correspondence with National Agency of Education officials 
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Capital funding 
 
19. No funding is given to new independent schools to help them meet 
the costs of start up. As a result, financing new entry is a key barrier to 
entry to the Swedish schools system; indeed 40% of independent 
schools that obtained a license in 2001 did not start up in the following 
year, mostly due to problems in obtaining facilities and meeting start-up 
costs.10 
 
20. However, the costs of entry are reduced significantly by limited 
central regulation of the standards that school premises have to meet 
and by encouraging the creation of small schools.11 Many new 
independent schools have, for example, converted houses for use as 
schools. 
 
21. The development of ‘chains’ of schools who are able to pool 
resources to meet the costs of opening new schools in the chain have 
made it easier to finance the costs of entry and find the expertise 
necessary to successfully manage the process of entry.12 
 
Information and support given to parents 
 
22. The provision of information and advice given to parents in making 
their school choice decisions in Sweden is patchy.13 Some local 
authorities (such as the Nacka municipality in Stockholm), give 
comprehensive information, support and encouragement to parents to 
exercise their choices.14 However, many local authorities give little 
information to parents and do not encourage parents actively to make a 
choice – only 50% of parents say that they are given enough information 
to be able to make a choice of school.15 There is no legislative and little 
other central government encouragement or support given to local 
                                            
10 See “Decentralisation and choice in Sweden’s school system: Policy lessons for Canada” – Helen 
Raham- Society for the Advancement of Excellence in Education Occasional Paper 7 (July 2002) 
http://www.saee.ca/pdfs/014.pdf  
11 2002 data from Statistics Sweden shows that the average size of independent 7-16 schools is 112 
pupils versus 218 pupils in local authority schools. In post-16 schools, the average size of independent 
schools is 132 pupils, versus 645 in local authority schools 
12 These chains operate 30% of Independent schools in Sweden; see Bergström and Sandström (2002a) 
13 Source: discussions with officials, evidence from the NAE (50% of local authorities have not 
considered impact of choice) and comparison of literature given to parents prior to choice. 
14 “Customer Choice in Nacka: The Right to Choose School” – Nacka Municipality, Stockholm, 
Sweden (2002) – see www.nacka.se and www.nacka24.nacka.se  
15 See National Agency of Education (2003) 
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authorities in providing support and information to parents in exercising 
their choices.16 
 
23. Limited support for school transport is provided to parents in 
exercising their choices – local authorities only have to provide free 
transport to a child’s local school. If a parent wishes to choose a non-
local school, they usually must meet the costs incurred by their child in 
travelling to that school. 
 
The impact of reforms on educational outcomes in Sweden 
 
New entry of schools and parental choice 
 
24. There has been significant new entry of government-funded 
independent schools. In 2004/05 there were just over 1 million pupils in 
Sweden’s 4,963 compulsory schools.17 Of these, 565 schools were 
independent state schools, located within 171 of the 290 municipalities.18 
 
Table: 1 Extent of independent state schools in Sweden 
 
Independent 
state schools 
% of all 
schools 
Pupils in 
independent 
state 
schools 
% of 
total 
pupils 
% of 
municipalities 
with 
independent 
state schools 
1992/93 122     
1997/9819 296 6% 26,993 3% 41% 
1998/9917 331 7% 30,682 3% 43% 
1999/0017 371 7% 35,175 3% 45% 
2000/01 418 8% 41,501 4% 48% 
2001/02 475 9% 51,081 5% 51% 
2002/03 528 10% 57,637 5% 55% 
2003/04 554 11% 65,036 6% 57% 
2004/05 565 11% 69,451 7% 59% 
 
25. While this may seem a modest rate of entry, most of Sweden is highly 
rural reducing the feasibility of new schools entering the market – in 
                                            
16 Unlike in England and Wales, where the duties of local authorities to encourage parents to choose and 
provide them with information through composite prospectuses are clearly articulated in legislation 
17 There are voluntary pre-school classes for six-year-olds.  Pupils then enter straight-through, single 
compulsory comprehensive schools for 7-16-year-olds.  There are separate upper secondary schools at 16-
20+ and for adults. 
18 Skolverket annual school statistics volume 
19  Includes international schools and national boarding schools, although in 2000/01 there were only 
three boarding schools and seven international schools 
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urbanised areas a far higher proportion of children attend independent 
schools. For example in the Taby municipality, Stockholm, 28% of 
children attended independent 7-16 schools in 2002.20 
 
26. Innovative organisations have entered the school system, such as 
Montessori and Steiner, and some of their techniques have been 
adopted by existing state schools. As noted earlier, choice has been 
associated with the development of large school chains (30% of 
independent schools in Sweden are part of these chains).21 
 
Parental satisfaction 
 
27. 90% of Swedish parents now support parents being given a choice 
over which school their child attends.22 Most parents in Sweden are 
satisfied with the school their child goes to.23 The National Association 
of Education found that parents who exercised a choice were more 
satisfied than those who did not and that most of those dissatisfied with 
their school did not make a choice.24 
 
28. In one local authority that gives parents a lot of support in making an 
active choice of school (Nacka municipality in Stockholm) 99% of 
parents are able to choose their preferred pre-16 school. Parental 
satisfaction with the school system has risen from 79% prior to the 
choice reforms to 87% now.25 
 
Impact on standards 
 
29. Several studies conclude that the choice reforms have had a positive 
impact on standards – Bergstrom and Sandstrom (2002),26 Ahlin (2003)27 
                                            
20 Source: correspondence with Statistics Sweden 
21 Bergström and Sandström (2002a) 
22 National Agency of Education (2003) 
23 NAE differentiate between results from local authorities where there is relatively greater opportunity for 
choice and other authorities. This group are called ‘choice authorities’ and comprise Botkyrka, 
Stockholm, Sodertälje, Uppsala, Helsingborg and Vasterås. 
24 National Agency of Education (2003) 
25 See Nacka Municipality (2002) 
26 Bergström and Sandström (2002a) and  “School vouchers in practice: Competition won’t hurt you” - 
Bergström and Sandström – Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) Working Paper 578 
(2002b) www.iui.se  
27 “Does school competition matter? Effects of a large-scale choice reform on student performance” – 
Åsa Ahlin – Uppsala University Department of Economics Working Paper (2003) 
http://www.nek.uu.se/pdf/wp2003_2.pdf  
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and Bjorklund et al (2004)28 all find that the performance of children in 
municipal schools improves as the percentage of children enrolled in 
independent schools increases – where these competitive pressures are 
more intensive, performance is higher. 
 
30. Both Bergstrom and Sandstrom (2002) and Ahlin (2003) find 
statistically significant beneficial impacts on mathematics, but not for 
Swedish and English. The reason for this differential impact is unclear. 
One hypothesis would be that parents place a greater weight on 
mathematics than languages, thus giving schools an incentive to focus 
on improving in this area. 
 
31. Bjorklund et al29 find small gains only for native-born pupils with well-
educated parents (although other students are not hurt by competition 
from independent schools) and conclude that “the extra competitive 
pressure (in Sweden) added by allowing a choice of independent 
schools is probably relatively minor”. This may be in part due to the 
limited impact of choice in many areas due to the fact that Sweden is 
such a sparsely populated country. 41% of local authorities have had no 
entry at all from independent schools and a survey of local authority 
officials in 2002 found that half said that school choice is not a matter 
that had been discussed within the authority.30  
 
32. Bjorklund et al note that the ability of parents to choose an alternative 
local authority school is also likely to have had an impact and should be 
taken into account, although no research has been done into this as yet. 
 
Impact on segregation 
 
33. While there are no direct studies of the impact of the 1992 choice 
reforms on segregation,31 some studies32 have looked at the 
characteristics of parents who choose independent schools: 
• they find that those with a university education are 4.5 percentage 
points more likely to send their child to an independent school than 
students with parents that have only compulsory education. Foreign-
                                            
28 “Education, Equality and Efficiency – An analysis of Swedish school reforms during the 1990s” – 
Anders Björklund, Per-Anders Edin, Peter Frederiksson and Alan Krueger – SNS Welfare Policy Group 
(2003) http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/06-02-04-BJO.pdf  
29 Björklund et al (2003) 
30 National Agency of Education (2003) 
31 Lack of standardised achievement data make such assessments difficult 
32 See Björklund et al (2003) 
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born students are 3.3 percentage points more likely to attend 
independent schools than native-born students; however 
• these differences disappear if only independent schools with a 
general ethos are included (44% of independent school students are 
educated in such schools). This suggests much of the relationship 
between independent school enrolment and student background 
comes from schools with a particular profile, be it a subject, 
pedagogical, confessional or ethnic. 
 
34. One study33 has suggested that the choice reforms have had a 
segregating impact, although there is no solid empirical basis to this 
claim. It is based on anecdotal evidence from local authorities and 
includes case studies from just two schools. There is no attempt to 
isolate the impact of choice reforms from other potential drivers of 
segregation.  
 
35. In a separate reform, Stockholm City municipality introduced selection 
by ability into upper secondary schools in 2000. A study investigating 
its impact showed segregation in schools rose along the lines of ability, 
immigration and socio-economic status compared schools elsewhere in 
the county. There was no change in the degree of residential 
segregation. This study could be misinterpreted as providing support for 
the hypothesis that the choice reforms in Sweden have caused 
segregation.34 Rather, it lends support to the hypothesis that allowing 
schools to select by ability leads to higher segregation.  
 
36. PISA results show that more than a decade after the reforms, Sweden 
is one of the least ability-segregated school systems in the OECD.35 
While these results cannot be used to compare levels of segregation 
before and after reform it is clear that, post-reform, segregation by ability 
is still at a very low level in comparison with other countries. Recent 
research, also using PISA, suggests that social segregation (on the basis 
of the Dissimilarity index) is also one of the lowest in the OECD.36  
                                            
33 National Agency of Education Report 230 (2003); this was the study suggesting that segregation in 
Sweden has increased that was cited by the NUT given in their evidence to the Education and Skills 
Select Committee enquiry into the Schools White Paper  
34 “School choice and segregation: Evidence from an admissions reform”- Söderström and Uusitalo – 
Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) – Working Paper 2005:7 (January 2005) 
http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2005/wp05-07.pdf  
35 OECD (2000, 2003) 
http://www.pisa.oecd.org/pages/0,2987,en_32252351_32235731_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
36 Micklewright et al (2006) ‘Social Segregation in Schools: How does England Compare with Other 
Countries?’ ISER Working Paper 2006-2. Pooled data for PISA 2000 and 2003 used. Further details of 
results can be found in the appendix. 
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Impact on equity 
 
37. In terms of the impact of reforms on equity, Bjorklund et al37 conclude 
that “there is no evidence suggesting that students are hurt by 
competition with independent schools” but foreign-born students and 
children with poorly educated parents do not gain from an increase in 
the percentage of children attending independent schools in a local area. 
International comparative research suggests however that Sweden 
continues to have one of the most equitable school systems in the 
OECD.38  
 
 
 
 
                                            
37 Björklund et al (2003) 
38 OECD (2000, 2003)  
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3. THE USA 
 
Summary 
 
• The US is a large, urbanised country, with relatively poor outcomes on 
international tests. The system has traditionally been characterised as 
one of little choice with children allocated to their neighbourhood 
school. Segregated neighbourhoods led to segregated schooling.  
 
• The No Child Left Behind Act was introduced in 2001, with bipartisan 
support, to hold schools more accountable for their performance and 
provide more choice for parents whose children attend poorly 
performing schools. It is too early to evaluate this policy, but evidence is 
available from a number of earlier related policies at the state level: 
• Accountability systems: Evidence from Florida suggests that 
poorly performing schools are more likely to improve if they are 
faced with the threat of parental choice (and the real prospect that 
funding will follow the pupil away from the school) even without 
the children necessarily leaving.  
• Charter schools: The experience of publicly-funded independent 
“charter schools” is mixed, reflecting the diversity inherent in the 
policy and the different accountability and funding regimes 
operating in different states.  
• Other parental choice schemes: The experience of Milwaukee 
suggests a well-designed parental choice scheme can enhance 
standards and equity. Key design features are that schools have 
financial incentives to compete for students through funding 
following the pupil, that parents are able to exercise their right to 
choose and that schools have freedom to innovate. 
 
 
Context 
 
38. The US is a heavily urbanised country with a population of 293 
million, around five times higher than the UK. Population density is low 
on average with 30 people per square kilometre (12% of the population 
density in the UK), although this varies dramatically by state. The US is 
ethnically diverse with nearly one in four from a minority ethnic group 
(13% black, 4% Asian, 2% native and 4% ‘other’).39 Minority ethnic 
                                            
39 Source: US Census 2000. Around 12.5% of the US population are Hispanic. However Hispanic is not 
a standard US race category – according to census 2000, just under half of Hispanics are classed as 
‘White’ and a similar proportion are classed as being part of ‘some other race’. 
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representation is higher in cities and communities are often racially 
segregated. Income inequality is high in the US with a Gini coefficient40 
of 0.36 compared to 0.33 in the UK. 
 
39. US performance in international tests is modest, at about the OECD 
average in both reading literacy and mathematics. For example in PISA 
2000 the US was the 15th highest performer in the OECD in reading 
literacy and the 18th highest performer in mathematics out of 27 
participating OECD countries. In the same test, the UK was the 7th 
highest performer in reading and the 8th in maths.41 
 
40. The impact of socio-economic status on results is moderate relative to 
other OECD countries, although the effect of socio-economic status 
appears to be greater in mathematics. However the absolute performance 
of the least well-off is below the OECD average compared to similarly 
deprived pupils elsewhere: The US has the 13th highest performance of 
deprived pupils in reading and the 17th highest performance of the worst-
off in maths – in comparison the UK came 9th and 8th respectively. Further 
details on the performance of countries in international tests can be 
found in the appendix. 
 
41. It is important to note that the US system of education is highly 
decentralised with provision of primary and secondary education set at 
the state level. As a consequence, there is a great deal of variation in the 
provision of education, and subsequent availability of school choice, by 
state. 
 
The US school system prior to reform 
 
42. Prior to the introduction of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001, there 
was ‘no school choice’ for many parents – children were generally 
allocated to their closest school on the basis of where they lived.42 Only 
those who were able to move neighbourhoods or opt out of public 
education were able to determine where their child went to school. 
 
                                            
40 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
41 Research estimating the extent of response bias in the English samples of PISA 2000 and 2003 
suggests that the bias in mean scores would have shifted England’s position by about one place. Further 
details can be found in the appendix.  
42 There were however some exceptions to this, with some areas of the US introducing charter schools 
and vouchers in the 1990s 
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43. The outcomes produced by the US system43 were poor (relative to 
other countries) in terms of educational standards (particularly amongst 
the least well-off); equity between groups; and the degree of racial and 
other segregation driven by extensive residential segregation of ethnic 
minorities and low income groups. Segregated neighbourhoods 
produced segregated schooling. Parents of children in the catchment 
areas of poorly performing schools had no option but to send their 
children there; whilst the schools concerned had few incentives to raise 
their game or to pay attention to what parents wanted. 
 
The No Child Left Behind Act44 
 
44. The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act was introduced in 2001, with bi-
partisan support, to hold schools more accountable for their performance 
and to provide the parents of children enrolled in persistently poorly-
performing schools the opportunity to transfer to an alternative school. 
 
45. This built on experiences in a number of US states in the 1990s of 
introducing more rigorous accountability systems and increasing the 
choices that parents were offered, through charter schools and voucher 
schemes. 
 
46. Under the Act, every State had to introduce annual standardised tests 
to assess progress made by students in reading and maths. Each state 
designs their own tests based on the curricula that are set locally. The 
results of these tests must be disseminated to parents annually in report 
cards on educational performance in the school district and schools 
within it. Results of the tests must be disaggregated by race, gender, 
ethnicity, English language, disability status and low income status. 
Report cards must also set out the qualifications of teachers and identify 
schools needing improvement, corrective action or restructuring. 
 
47. The NCLB Act applies even more strictly to those schools that receive 
Federal ‘Title I’ funding (the extra funding for schools with high 
proportions of disadvantaged children and ethnic minorities). For these 
“Title I” schools, the State must define minimum levels of improvement 
in student performance that schools must achieve in time frames 
specified by the NCLB Act (“Adequate Yearly Progress”), working 
towards the Federal Government’s 2013/14 goal of achieving 100% 
                                            
43 PISA 2000, 2003 
44 See US Department of Education www.ed.gov; “Managing School Underperformance with Increased 
Parental Choice: Interim Paper” – Social Market Foundation 2005 (unpublished) 
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proficiency in reading and maths. To meet their ‘Adequate Yearly 
Progress’ targets, each school must make acceptable levels of progress 
towards the goal of achieving 100% reading and maths proficiency for 
each demographic group of children by 2013/14. 
 
48. Intervention is triggered in “Title I” schools that do not meet their  
‘Adequate Yearly Progress’ targets: 
• any ‘Title I’ school which does not make ‘Adequate Yearly 
Progress’ for two years in succession is identified as ‘needing 
improvement’. Students in the school must be offered the option 
of transferring to an alternative public school in the district (which 
may include a charter school) that has not been designated as 
needing improvement. The school must develop an improvement 
plan and the local education authority must ensure that the school 
receives technical assistance in doing this; 
• if a school fails to make ‘Adequate Yearly Progress’ for three 
consecutive years, children from low-income families must be 
offered supplementary educational services such as tutoring or 
remedial classes; 
• if a school fails to make ‘Adequate Yearly Progress’ for four 
consecutive years, the local authority must implement certain 
corrective actions to improve the school such as replacing certain 
staff, implementing a new curriculum, extending the school year or 
extending the school day; or 
• if a school fails to make ‘Adequate Yearly Progress’ for five 
consecutive years, the local authority must initiate plans to 
restructure the school. Options open to the LA include reopening 
the school as a charter school, replacing all or most of the staff in 
the school or turning over the operation of the school to the state 
or to a private education company. 
 
49. While the ‘Adequate Yearly Progress “bar”’ is set at different heights 
in different states, the Act has given a lot of stimulus to school reform in 
the USA. However academics45 have warned of the dangers of using 
school test scores for accountability purposes, particularly for small 
schools. This is because year-on-year changes in test scores are found 
to be mostly due to random influences – such as classroom chemistry 
between teacher and class or a particularly disruptive pupil – rather than 
any real change in school performance. 
                                            
45 Staiger et al (2002) “The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol.16, No.4.  
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50. While it is too early to draw conclusions on the impact of the No Child 
Left Behind Act, similar reforms were introduced in many states during 
the 1990s and we can look at the impact of these. The remainder of this 
section therefore reviews examples of accountability systems (focusing 
on the experiences of Florida); charter schools; open enrolment; and 
other parental choice schemes (focussing on the experiences of 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin). 
 
Accountability systems 
 
51. Educational accountability systems can include goals and targets, 
methods of monitoring progress and forms of intervention if goals are 
not being met. The No Child Left Behind Act introduced stronger 
accountability systems linked to enhanced choice for parents where 
schools were poorly performing across the US. Florida has had such a 
system in place for several years through “The A+ Programme”. 
Evaluation of the impact of this programme46 shows that standards 
improved faster in schools where there was a greater threat of the 
exercise of parental choice and exit. 
 
The Florida A+ Programme 
 
52. The Florida A+ Programme gives children in schools that persistently 
fail the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) the 
opportunity to choose an alternative school (through vouchers for 
independent schools). Grades are assigned to schools (A through to F) 
on the basis of the performance of children in each school. Choice is 
offered to all children attending schools assigned an F-grade in any two 
years during a four year period. 
 
53. The authors of the evaluation of Florida in 2002/03 identify five 
categories of school based on the degree of ‘threat’ faced from vouchers 
(based on the grade that they receive): 
• eligible for vouchers: Schools that have received two Fs since 
grades were first given in 1998/99 [Receiving vouchers]; 
• schools facing the threat of vouchers: Schools receiving one F-
grade during the three school years before 2002/03 [High threat of 
vouchers]; 
                                            
46 See “Competition passes the test” – Greene and Winters – Education Next 2004(3) 
http://www.educationnext.org/20043/pdf/66.pdf  
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• always D Schools: These schools are not voucher threatened, but 
face a real prospect of doing so unless they improve. As grades 
are not based on average scores but on the percentage of 
students meeting appropriate levels of proficiency, many of these 
schools have lower test scores than F-schools. As a result they 
have real incentives to improve under the A+ Scheme [Moderate 
threat of vouchers]; 
• sometimes D Schools: [Small threat of vouchers]; and 
• formerly threatened schools: Received an F in 1998/99 but none 
since i.e. have survived the four year ‘threat’ period without 
receiving an F-grade [Limited threat of vouchers]. 
 
The impact of the Florida A+ Programme 
 
54. The evaluation found that the greater the degree of threat from 
vouchers, the greater the improvement in performance seen in 2002/03 
(after controlling for demographic factors) – see Figure 1. The authors 
find that this result also holds when using the results of national tests 
(for which the schools were not accountable) suggesting that the 
improvement was not due to ‘teaching to the test’. Similar results were 
found in other research.47 Chakrabarti (2005) found that the performance 
gap between ‘F-schools’ and ‘D-schools’ only closed when the scheme 
was introduced; prior to the scheme there was a persistent attainment 
gap between D and F schools.  
 
                                            
47 Chakrabarti, R. (2005) ‘Impact of Voucher Design on Public School Performance: Evidence from 
Florida and Milwaukee Programs’ 
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Figure 1. Annual Gain in Test Scores by Degree of Voucher 
Threat
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55. More recent research (West and Peterson, 2005) utilises pupil level data 
– as opposed to the school level data used in the research used above48 – 
and uses the impact of a shake up in the grading system in 2002, resulting 
in over half of the schools receiving a different grade to the year before. 
The researchers examined the performance responses of ‘shocked’ schools 
who just dipped a grade compared to those that just managed to hang on 
to their grade. 
56. West and Peterson found that students in ‘shocked’ F schools 
performed at a higher level in the subsequent year than students at similar 
schools classed as a D grade. However, when this effect is disaggregated 
for different groups results were only significant for African-American 
pupils, pupils eligible for free school lunches and low ability students. 
Results were insignificant for White, Hispanic and less disadvantaged 
pupils. 
Charter schools 
 
57. Charter schools are publicly-funded independent schools set up by a 
legal “charter”. This allows them to be self-governing, independent of 
any local school district and free of many restrictive regulations allowing 
                                            
48 West and Peterson state that in using school level data, it is unknown whether gains constituted actual 
improvements in the performance of individual students or were due to changes in the composition of 
those taking the test – which could occur as the result of migration between schools or the exclusion of 
low-performing students from participation in these high stakes tests. See West, M and Peterson, P.  
(2005) ‘The efficacy of choice threats within school accountability systems: results from legislatively 
induced experiments’ 
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them to be more innovative than traditional public schools. They are 
generally established by educators, parents, community groups or 
private organisations with an express purpose or philosophy. The 
charter is a contract between the state or local school district and the 
school, and sets out the freedoms the school has and performance 
targets that the school must meet as a condition of receiving public 
funding. If the school does not deliver the specified educational 
outcomes within a certain period (usually three to five years), the charter 
may be revoked and public funding for the school withheld. 
 
The impact of charter schools on standards 
 
58. The debate on the impact of charter schools in the US is wide-ranging 
and energetic, revealing mixed results.  In 2004 the US Department for 
Education published analysis which compared the attainment of just 
over 3000 students in 150 charter schools with around 188,000 public 
school students.49 It showed that overall, charter school pupils were less 
likely to reach proficiency in maths than public school pupils but that 
there was no difference in reading proficiency.   
 
59. This report was fiercely contested on methodological grounds and 
sparked a number of research studies demonstrating that charter schools 
produce gains in attainment. For example Hoxby’s 2004 study compared 
national charter school performance to matched public schools and 
found that charter school students were around 5% more likely to be 
proficient in reading and 3% more likely to be proficient in maths than 
their peers in similar regular public schools.50 However Lubienski and 
Lubienski (2006) have recently criticised this research.51 They found that 
after controlling for demographic and location differences, charter 
schools did not perform as well as public schools in 4th grade but 
did better (although not statistically significantly) in 8th grade.  
 
60. The difficulty in detecting national effects may reflect differing laws 
governing them from state to state; different funding regimes that exist 
                                            
49 Several academic studies have been conducted into the performance of charter schools. The Federal 
evaluation report “Evaluation of the Public Charter School Programme: Final Report” – US 
Department of Education (2004) can be found at http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/choice/pcsp-
final/finalreport.pdf. There are many sites dedicated to disseminating research findings on Charter schools 
– see for example http://www.uscharterschools.org/    
50Hoxby (2004) ‘Achievement in Charter Schools and Regular Public Schools in the United States: 
Understanding the Differences’ 
51 Lubienski and Lubienski (2006) ‘Charter, Private, Public Schools and Academic Achievement: New 
Evidence from NAEP Mathematics Data’  
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and the degree of local experimentation and diversity inherent in the 
policy.52 
 
61. Positive effects of charter schools have been found in more localised 
studies – for example in Chicago charter schools where allocation of 
places in oversubscribed charter schools was conducted by lottery. 
Research into the impact of these charter schools on standards finds 
that compared to lotteried-out applicants, students who attend charter 
schools starting in the elementary grades score about six national 
percentile rank points higher in both maths and reading.53 
 
62. Some studies have also found that the performance of state schools 
has improved in response to competition from charter schools.  Hoxby’s 
analysis of the impact of charter schools in Michigan and Arizona finds 
that public schools facing charter competition raised their achievement, 
exceeding not only their previous performance but also improving 
relative to other schools not subjected to charter competition.54  
However, recent research reanalysing the data in Michigan finds no 
significant positive effect of charter schools on the attainment of pupils 
within them or on neighbouring public schools.55  
 
The impact of charter schools on equity 
 
63. Critics56 have claimed that in Minnesota (the first US state to 
introduce charter schools) many of the charter schools that served 
disadvantaged children have closed with the remainder serving only the 
rich. This is not borne out by academic research. Minnesota charter 
schools currently take twice as many low income students and three 
times as many ethnic minorities as the Minnesota state-wide average.57  
 
64. The most recent federal government evaluation of charter schools 
more generally found that “charter schools disproportionately attract 
                                            
52 For discussion of this, see for example “Charter Schools in Action: Renewing Public Education” – 
Chester Finn Jr, Bruno Manno and Gregg Vanourek – Princeton University Press (2000) 
53 Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) ‘The Impact of Charter Schools on Student Achievement: A Study of 
Students Who Attend Schools Chartered by the Chicago Charter School Foundation’ 
54 Hoxby (2003) ‘School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States’ –Swedish 
Economic Review 10  
55 Bettinger (2005) ‘The effect of charter schools on charter students and public schools’ – Economics of 
Education Review 24 
56 For example, “Shaping the Education Bill: Reaching for Consensus” – Compass (2005) 
57 “Ripples of innovation: Charter schooling in Minnesota, the Nation’s first Charter School state” – 
John Schroeder – Progressive Policy Institute (April 2004) 
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/MN_Charters_0504.pdf  
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students and families who are poor and who are from African American 
backgrounds”.58 
 
65. The challenges faced by charter schools reflect the fact that they are 
commonly founded for students who are badly served by traditional 
schools (e.g. pregnant teens, drop-outs, difficult to teach children) and 
are often set up in poor neighbourhoods. Indeed, the No Child Left 
Behind Act gives a greater stimulus to the development of charter 
schools in these areas. 
 
Open Enrolment 
 
66. The most prevalent type of choice programme in the US is open 
enrolment, of which there are two basic types: 
• intra-district: policies which allow a student to opt out of their pre-
assigned neighbourhood school to another school within his or her 
school district; and 
• inter-district: policies which allow a student to transfer to a school 
outside his or her home district.   
 
67. The implementation and funding of open enrolment – for example the 
extent to which funding follows pupils and whether the state pays for 
transport costs – varies significantly by state. Indeed most public school 
districts still assign pupils to particular schools on the basis of 
residence. For example, US Department of Education data shows that in 
2003 15 per cent of public school students attended a school the family 
had chosen, up from 11 per cent in 1993. 
 
The impact of open enrolment – an example from Chicago  
  
68. Evaluation of an open enrolment scheme in Chicago Public Schools 
(CPS) finds that pupils do exercise a high degree of choice – around half 
of students opt out of their assigned school to attend a different CPS 
school.59  Furthermore, those students who opt out of their 
neighbourhood school are around eight percentage points more likely to 
graduate than observationally equivalent students who do not.60 
                                            
58 US Department of Education (2004) 
59 Chicago Public Schools are often contested for not being a ‘pure’ choice system because money does 
not follow students and schools are unable to expand and contract (Hoxby, 2003).  Burgess et al (2005) 
however, argue it is similar to the English system as parents and schools can exercise choice and schools 
cannot change size rapidly. 
60 Cullen J, Jacob B and Levitt S, (2000), ‘The impact of school choice on student outcomes: an 
analysis of the Chicago public schools’, NBER Working Paper 7888, Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
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69. However the evaluation argues that the improvement is not a result of 
pupils finding better schools or matched preferences but rather that 
those who opt out have superior unobservable characteristics such as 
motivation levels and parental involvement (with the exception of those 
attending career academies).  The authors suggest there may therefore 
be non-academic reasons for opting out such as moving to a school with 
lower levels of violence.  
 
Other parental choice schemes 
 
70. A number of local areas in the US have introduced voucher schemes 
to allow low income families to choose an independent school alternative 
to public schooling. The voucher schemes that exist in the US are 
different to those that some commentators61 have suggested be 
introduced in the UK as they are targeted on only those on low incomes, 
do not allow top-up fees from parents and are subject to strict 
admissions regulation by the State. US independent schools are also 
generally of a very different character to those in the UK: many are low-
fee charging religious institutions (the separation of Church and State in 
the US mean that religious schools are unable to enter the public school 
system as they are in the UK); and are less likely to be selective than the 
UK independent sector. 
 
Impact of vouchers on standards 
 
71. The evidence on the impact of vouchers on performance is mixed and 
contested, at least on observed attainment measures such as test scores.  
For example, a randomised field trial of vouchers for low income pupils to 
attend independent schools in New York found positive effects on test 
scores relative to their peers in state schools albeit only for African-
American pupils.62  However re-analysis of the data, correcting for 
attrition problems and re-categorising ethnic groups, shows no 
                                            
61 For example, the Adam Smith Institute have suggested that all British parents be given a voucher that 
they are able to use in  private schools that are both able to choose which children they admit (no 
admissions regulation) and charge top-up fees (e.g. parents would be able to use their voucher to attend 
elite schools such as Eton if they could afford a co-payment of several thousand pounds) – see for 
example “Delivering better education: Market solutions for Educational Improvement” – Tooley, 
Dixon and Stanfield – Adam Smith Institute (2003) 
http://www.adamsmith.org/images/uploads/publications/delivering-better-edu.pdf  
62 Peterson and Howell (2003) ‘Latest Results from the New York City Voucher Experiment’  
Association of Public Policy Management 
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significant impact of the programme on any pupils’ achievement.63 
However a less contested finding from the New York programme was 
that choice does improve parental satisfaction with their child’s school 
and increases parent-school communication.64 
 
72. The experience of the Milwaukee (Wisconsin) parental choice scheme 
demonstrates the importance of the design of a scheme on its impact on 
standards, segregation and equity, due to the way the scheme has 
evolved through time. We can track the impact of the initial voucher 
scheme and the impact after several important changes were made to its 
operation after 1998. 
 
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Scheme 
 
The pre-1998 scheme 
 
73. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was introduced in 1989. From 
the 1990/91 school year, children in households where income did not 
exceed 175% of the Federal poverty line were eligible to apply for 
vouchers to enable them to attend secular independent schools. 
Available vouchers were allocated by lottery to applicants. 
 
74. Initially the numbers allowed to participate in the programme were 
capped at 1% of total enrolment in the Milwaukee public school district. 
The voucher was also only worth $2,500 (38% of per-pupil funding in the 
Milwaukee public school district) or the cost of tuition at the 
independent school, whichever was the lowest. 
 
75. Milwaukee schools did not lose any funding if a child took up a 
voucher. There were also several legal challenges to the voucher scheme 
initially, leading to uncertainty over whether the scheme would continue. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
63 Krueger and Zhu (2003) ‘Another Look at the New York City School Voucher Experiment”’ 
American Behavior Scientist 
64 Peterson, Wolf, Howell and Campbell (2002) ‘School Vouchers and Academic Performance: Results 
from Three Randomized Field Trials’  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 
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The impact of the pre-1988 scheme 
 
76. The official evaluation of the scheme65 compared the performance of 
voucher students to a randomly selected sample of public school 
students and to a random sample of applicants to the scheme who were 
not allocated a voucher. There were no significant differences in 
performance between voucher students and similar public school 
students. Comparisons between voucher students and those applicants 
who failed in the lottery revealed better performance among voucher 
students.66  
 
Post-1998 Scheme 
 
77. A number of changes were made to the scheme, which came into force 
in 1998: 
• religious schools were allowed to participate in the scheme;  
• the cap on the number of vouchers was lifted to 15% of enrolment 
in the public school system (and the cap became non-binding – 
everyone who was eligible and wanted a voucher got one); 
• the value of the voucher was lifted to $5,000; and 
• the Milwaukee Public School system lost 45% of funding for each 
pupil that took up a voucher. 
 
The impact of the post-1998 scheme 
 
78. Funding for official evaluation of the scheme was removed in 1998 – 
however Caroline Hoxby at Harvard University has analysed the impact 
of the post-1998 scheme.67 The study found significant performance 
gains in public schools that faced high degrees of competition as a result 
of the voucher scheme (measured by the proportion of children who 
                                            
65 Summarised in “Achievement Effects of the Milwaukee Public School Voucher Program” – Paper 
presented by John Witte (UW-Madison university) to the American Economics Association Annual 
Meeting 3-6 January 1997 (1997) http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/choice/aea97.html; “2nd/3rd/4th/5th year 
reports: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program”  - John Witte et al – Department of Political Science 
and The Robert Lafelle Institute of Public Affairs, Madison, Wisconsin (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/choice/choice_biblio.html  
66 Similar findings were reported in “The effectiveness of schools in Milwaukee: a secondary analysis of 
data from the programs evaluators” – Greene, Peterson and Du (1996) – Program of Educational Policy 
and Governance Occasional Paper, Department of Government and Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University. However, the official evaluation rejected these findings due to biases in the ‘control’ 
group caused by non-random attrition of the group. See “Reply to Greene, Peterson and Du” – John 
Witte (1996)  http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/choice/replytoc.html 
67 See “School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States” – Caroline Hoxby – 
Swedish Economic Review 10 (2003) 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/hoxby_2.pdf  
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were potentially eligible for vouchers and also using a control group of 
similar children in Wisconsin who the scheme did not apply to).  
 
Discussion 
 
79. We can identify two phases of the Milwaukee scheme – the pre-1998 
scheme in which the choice reforms had no impact on standards and the 
post-1998 scheme which did. 
 
80. It seems the design of the initial scheme did not give the Milwaukee 
public school system incentives to improve their performance. Few 
children could take up vouchers due to the cap on numbers, Milwaukee 
schools did not lose out financially from losing students to independent 
schools (indeed, this relieved pressure on the school system to some 
extent given the context of increasing student numbers) and there was 
uncertainty about whether the scheme would continue due to legal 
challenges. The 1998 reforms operated to increase the incentives that the 
public school system had to alter their behaviour and improve their 
performance to try to keep students who were eligible for vouchers 
within the public school system. 
 
81. This explanation of why the post-1998 scheme improved performance 
where the initial scheme failed is borne out by analysis of the 
behavioural response of the public school system to the voucher 
scheme. Hoxby (2003)68 concluded that “Milwaukee did not feel normal 
competitive pressures over this time [during the pre-1998 operation of 
the scheme]”.  
 
82. This is supported by interviews with Milwaukee public school 
officials and analysis of their behaviour.69 Howard Fuller, head of the 
Milwaukee public school district has said of the scheme that “…to be 
blunt a thousand poor kids leaving at $2,900 each meant 
squat…vouchers had nothing to do with what I did or what I was able to 
do”.  
 
83. The change in attitude after reforms to the voucher scheme is clear to 
see from later interviews with public school officials. For example, in 
1995, when legislation was being passed to alter the policy, a member of 
                                            
68 Hoxby (2003) ‘School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States’ –Swedish 
Economic Review 10 
69 See Hess (2002) “Revolutions at the margins: the impact of competition on urban school systems” – 
Frederik Hess – Brookings Institute Press  
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the Milwaukee school board is quoted by Hess (2002) as saying that 
“The nervousness about choice expansion really started [in 1995] when 
it became pretty clear that expansion was going to be passed…Board 
candidates…suddenly made noises about all the reforms they were 
going to do…Choice brought external pressures”.70 
 
84. As a result, the Milwaukee school board began to alter the 
organisation of schooling in Milwaukee, for example by: 
• introducing new “Innovative Schools” (similar to charters) who 
had more autonomy; 
• funding all Milwaukee public schools on a per-pupil basis; 
• increasing high school graduation requirements; 
• toughened public school accountability; and 
• acknowledging parents at public schools had made an active 
choice to be there and being more willing to listen to them and 
involve them in school life. 
 
85. Hess71 concludes that “The most significant effects of competition 
were the political changes that allowed entrepreneurs in the Milwaukee 
public school system to emerge…the presence of limited competition 
had not refocused teachers or principals or changed the manner in which 
they approached their jobs. It produced some new efforts to raise 
standards, increase choices and open new schools, but little evidence 
that these moves affected classrooms…The Milwaukee experience 
shows that the effects of a choice program on the public school system 
is dependent upon the degree of competition posed by the 
program…Further, the changes that can be produced…are dependent on 
the willingness of union leaders to relax procedural structures, or system 
leaders to push for change and of entrepreneurial educators to take 
advantage of any proffered options”. 
 
 
                                            
70 Ibid 
71 Ibid 
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4. NEW ZEALAND 
 
Summary 
 
• New Zealand is a small, diverse country, which performs very well in 
international tests – driven by the very high performance of the top 5% 
of pupils. Before the 1980s, the schools system was highly centralised, 
with a lot of control for the Department of Education and little choice for 
parents within the state system. 
 
• The 1989 ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ reforms radically changed the New 
Zealand school system. They removed control over schools from local 
education boards and give parents a choice over which school their 
child attended. However, in 1991, admissions regulations were abolished, 
leaving few safeguards to prevent schools “cream skimming” through 
selecting the pupils who are most likely to do well. No measures were put 
in place to support the less well-off in making choices. 
 
• In the five years following these changes, segregation by ethnicity, and 
to a lesser extent, socio-economic status, both increased. Research 
suggests that in the absence of any admissions code, schools had 
attempted to improve their in exam results by selecting pupils who were 
most likely to do well rather than improving the quality of the education 
that they provided. Controls over admissions were re-introduced by the 
new government in 1999. 
 
Context 
 
86. New Zealand is a small country, with a population of four million and 
low population density – around 15 people per square kilometre. Income 
inequality is similar to that found in the UK – a Gini coefficient72 of 0.34 
compared to 0.33 – although this is above the OECD average of 0.31. 
New Zealand is ethnically diverse with one in five from a non-white 
minority ethnic group (10% Maori, 4% Pacific Islanders, 8% Asian).  
 
87. New Zealand performs very well in international tests. For example in 
PISA 2000 New Zealand was the 3rd highest performer in the OECD in 
reading literacy and the 3rd highest performer in mathematics out of 27 
                                            
72 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
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participating OECD countries. In comparison, the UK was the 7th highest 
performer in reading and the 8th in maths. 
 
88. New Zealand’s strong performance PISA 2000 was driven by very 
high performance of higher ability (top 5%) pupils, who were the best 
performers in the OECD in both reading literacy and mathematics. 
However the performance of lower ability (bottom 5%) pupils was about 
average, ranked 12th in reading literacy compared to their peers in other 
OECD countries. Segregation by ability between schools is relatively 
low. New Zealand had the 17th (out of 26) highest amount of variation 
between the average performance of different schools in reading literacy. 
Further details on the performance of countries in international tests can 
be found in the appendix. 
 
The school system in New Zealand73 
 
89. Prior to 1989 reforms, the New Zealand school system was highly 
centralised. The Department of Education maintained a high degree of 
control and parents had no ‘choice’ over which school their child 
attended, other than through moving house or opting for a private 
alternative. 
 
90. The 1989 “Tomorrow’s Schools” reforms were part of a wider 
programme of market reforms that the Labour government introduced 
throughout the 1980s. There was also pressure to reform education due 
to concern over skill levels in New Zealand and the comparatively poor 
educational performance of less well-off groups and the Maori and 
Pacific Island minorities. 
 
91. There was a consensus that these problems were in part caused by 
over-centralisation of education – Fiske and Ladd (2000)74 note that 
schools had to ask local education boards permission to do virtually 
anything: from fixing a broken window to what colour the school gate 
should be painted. The resources a school received were also often 
unrelated to need – for example schools received an annual scissors 
entitlement. It was accepted that this was highly inefficient and that the 
department’s influence on the day-to-day operation of schools needed 
to be curtailed. There was also a perception that the department was 
                                            
73 For an overview, see “When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale” – Fiske and Ladd – Brookings 
Institute Press (2000) 
74 Fiske and Ladd (2000) “When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale” Brookings Institute Press 
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‘captured’ by interest groups, and this needed to be altered to put the 
interests of children back at the heart of education policy. 
 
92. A committee to review education75 was set up, with the government 
accepting most of its recommendations: 
• increasing school autonomy and dramatically reducing the size of 
the education department, concentrating on its role as a facilitator 
of education rather than a provider; 
• providing education funding as a general grant, giving head 
teachers autonomy over how they spend it; 
• setting up a system of school inspection to hold schools 
accountable for their performance; 
• abolishing ‘zoning’ – allocation of children to schools based on 
where they live. Interestingly this had cross-party consensus – 
from the right (from a perspective of increasing freedom and 
increasing competition between schools driving efficiency) and 
from the left (who perceived that inequalities in the education 
system were partly driven by the use of catchment-area allocation 
of children to schools); and 
• a series of education acts were passed to enforce these reforms in 
1989 and 1990. 
 
93. In 1990 the government was defeated in the general election. The 
incoming government removed some of the regulations on choice that 
were included in the previous legislation, including: 
• plans for regulations governing the criteria schools used to 
allocate children to schools in the presence of over-subscription 
were abandoned – it was initially envisaged that a small catchment 
area together with an admissions lottery would be used in these 
cases; 
• the ability of Community Forums to deal with disputes between 
neighbouring schools was curtailed; and 
• parent Advocacy Councils were abolished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
75 New Zealand, Taskforce to Review Education Administration. 1988. Administering for excellence: 
effective administration in education: report of the Taskforce to Review Education Administration. 
(Picot Report). Wellington. 
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The impact of reforms in New Zealand 
  
Standards 
 
94. It is very difficult to measure the impact of choice policies on 
educational quality at the secondary level in New Zealand. As 
secondary school certificate exams are not compulsory and the way they 
are graded inhibits comparisons over time.76 
 
Segregation 
 
95. Whilst there is little evidence available to assess the impact of the 
reforms on school standards, Fiske and Ladd (2000)77 and Waslander 
and Thrup (1995)78 conclude that the choice reforms led to increased 
segregation of pupils.  
 
96. Fiske and Ladd (2000) use the ‘dissimilarity index’ to analyse changes 
in the extent of segregation in urban secondary schools,79 and find that 
there was an increase in segregation of both ethnic minority students 
and of less well-off students (over and above that which occurred at 
ward level locally over the same time period) – segregation in schools 
increased by a greater amount than in the previous catchment areas. 
They also find that the proportion of minorities in the most deprived 
schools increased over time, and that minorities were less likely to flee 
deprived schools than white children. However recent research on 
international comparisons of social segregation80 suggests that New 
Zealand retains relatively low levels of social segregation compared to 
other countries in the OECD. 
 
97. From their analysis, Fiske and Ladd (2000) identified five key factors 
they saw as important in driving this increase in segregation: 
                                            
76 The Smithfield Project (see Lauder and Hughes 1999) attempted to do this, arguing that the existence 
of peer effects on a child’s academic performance combined with the increase in segregation experienced 
in New Zealand means that average performance must have decreased. This indirect evidence cannot be 
used to form a judgement on the impact of reforms (e.g. the size of peer effects may have decreased over 
time etc) 
77 Lauder and Hugher (1999) Trading in futures: Why markets in education do not work” –Open 
University Press 
78 “Choice, competition and segregation: An empirical analysis of a New Zealand Secondary 
Education Market 1990-1993” – Waslander and Thrup – Journal of Education Policy 10 (1995) 
79 Further details on how the dissimilarity index is calculated can be found in the appendix 
80 Micklewright et al (2006) ‘Social Segregation in Schools: How does England Compare with Other 
Countries?’ ISER Working Paper 2006-2. Pooled data for PISA 2000 and 2003 used. Further details of 
results can be found in the appendix. 
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• clear preferences among all parents for less deprived schools with 
lower minority enrolments;81 
• evidence that parents used the socio-economic composition of a 
school as a proxy for school quality – the researchers conclude 
that “schools with high initial proportions of minority students 
were at a competitive disadvantage”. This was exacerbated by the 
publication of ‘absolute’ league tables which gave the impression 
that schools with better intakes were of high quality;82 
• evidence from the Smithfield project83 – a  longitudinal study of the 
impact of educational reforms on students’ choices and outcomes – 
suggests that across New Zealand as a whole, those from less 
well-off socio-economic groups were more likely to choose to 
attend a non-local school. However, at the local level, those who 
exercised choice were better-off than those who did not. This 
evidence also suggested that families in higher socio-economic 
groups were more likely to apply to schools with lower 
proportions of disadvantaged groups; 
• less well-off families had extra constraints on their choices – there 
was limited transport support in the scheme restricting access to 
more distant schools; and 
• the lack of admissions regulation worked to the disadvantage of 
less well-off groups – The Smithfield Project84 found that, even 
after controlling for ability, the probability that a student will be 
accepted by a ‘high status’ school is higher for children from 
better-off backgrounds. 
 
Responses of schools to parental choice 
 
98. Waslander and Thrup (1995)85 conclude from interviews with 
principals and case studies of the impact of choice that there was a 
limited impact on standards because of perverse incentives arising from 
the way the choice scheme was designed (though, as mentioned earlier, 
                                            
81 Although a surprising finding (given evidence from the UK) was that the preference ordering of parents 
from different backgrounds was remarkably similar – there were no obvious differences in how parents 
from different groups chose schools 
82 We know from the UK experience that individual performance in school and socio-economic 
background are linked, and that many schools performing ‘poorly’ on absolute measures are performing 
better for their children than other schools with ‘good’ results on this measure 
83 Cited in“Trading in futures: Why markets in education do not work” – Lauder and Hughes – Open 
University Press (1999) 
84 Lauder and Hughes (1999) 
85 “Choice, Competition and Segregation: An Empirical Analysis of a New Zealand Secondary 
Education Market 1990-1993” – Waslander and Thrup - Journal of Education Policy 10 (1995) 
 37 
there is no hard empirical evidence on the impact on standards). Similar 
behavioural responses were found by Fiske and Ladd (2000):86 
• schools could use admissions criteria to “improve” their intake 
(and some used political influence to reduce their enrolment 
number and so become able to introduce enrolment criteria to 
“improve” their intake); 
• choices by parents (both ethnic minorities and whites) were 
largely influenced by the ethnic and socio-economic profile of the 
school (desire to enrol their children in schools with lower 
proportions of minorities); 
• schools engaged in wasteful ‘marketing’ expenditure rather than 
attempts to improve the teaching and learning in their school in 
response to losing pupils; however 
• one positive development was that schools increased 
consultation with parents to establish what they wanted from a 
school. 
 
99. A 1996 report by the New Zealand Ministry of Education 
acknowledged that the removal of admissions regulations in 1991 may 
have damaged schools serving disadvantaged groups.87 
 
The Education Amendment Act 2000 
 
100. A key driver of the segregating impact of the 1989 reforms was the 
removal of admissions regulations on school over-subscription criteria in 
1991. 
 
101. Upon re-election of a Labour government in December 1999, controls 
over the admissions policies used by schools were reintroduced: 
• children were given an absolute right to attend their local school, 
with enrolment schemes specifying catchment areas (‘home 
zones’) in which children had a right to attend the school; 
• admissions authorities had to consult with the community in 
designing their enrolment schemes; 
• every child was given the right to be in the ‘home zone’ of at least 
one school, to guarantee every child a school place; 
• the over-subscription criteria used after places have been 
allocated to everyone in the ‘home zone’ who wants a school 
place were required to be (in the following order): 
                                            
86 Fiske and Ladd (2000) 
87 “Towards making achievement cool: Achievement in multi-cultural high schools” – Hawk and Hill – 
Massey University Educational Research and Development Centre (1996) 
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- applicants for ‘special programmes’ in the school; 
- siblings of current students; 
- siblings of former students; 
- children of employees; and 
- random lotteries. 
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5. THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Summary 
 
• The Netherlands is a heavily urbanised country, which has performed 
well on international tests. The freedom to found schools and receive 
public funding has been a key constitutional right for Dutch citizens 
since 1917. This enables parents to obtain State funding to send their 
children to faith schools. 
 
• Low barriers to entry have clearly stimulated the participation of 
voluntary groups in the provision of schooling. 70% of Dutch pupils 
now attend privately-operated schools. 
 
• As choice and diversity have been features of the system for 90 years, 
their impact on standards cannot be isolated. The selective nature of the 
admissions system has led to high levels of segregation by ability. 
Policy makers are concerned about levels of ethnic segregation but it 
appears that residential segregation is the key driver of this.  
 
Context 
 
102. The Netherlands is a heavily urbanised country with a population of 
16.3 million. Population density, at 393 people per square kilometre, is 
60% higher than the population density in the UK. One in ten of the 
Dutch population are from a minority ethnic group - predominately from 
Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia and former colonies. Communities are often 
highly segregated by race. Income inequality is one of the lowest in the 
OECD with a Gini coefficient88 of 0.25, compared to 0.33 in the UK. 
 
103. The Netherlands performed well in PISA 200389, ranking amongst the 
top five countries for reading literacy. The selective nature of the school 
system in the Netherlands means there tends to be a relatively high 
degree of segregation by ability between schools compared with other 
countries in the OECD. 
 
 
                                            
88 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
89 Data used for international comparisons from PISA 2003. This is because there is no internationally 
comparable data for the Netherlands in PISA 2000 due to low response rates. 
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The school system in the Netherlands 
 
The ‘right to supply’ 
 
104. ‘Freedom of education’ – the freedom to found schools; to receive 
public funding; to organise teaching; and to determine the principles on 
which schools are based – is a key right of Dutch citizens (guaranteed 
by Article 23 of the 1917 constitution). 
 
105. This means that any individual body has the right to found schools 
and to provide teaching based on religious, ideological or educational 
beliefs.90 As a result, public funding is given to both government-
operated and privately-operated schools in the Netherlands.91 
Approximately 70% of children attend privately operated schools in the 
Netherlands.92 
 
106. It is important to note that the ‘right to supply’ was not designed with 
the aim of raising standards (as is the case for most modern education 
reforms that have attempted to remove barriers to school entry). The 
1917 decision to fund privately-operated schools equally was made to 
enable parents to obtain State funding to allow them to send their 
children to faith schools. 
 
Selection 
 
107. The Dutch education system is highly selective, with children 
streamed into one of three different types of school at the age of 12 
(broadly academic or vocational streams). Children share the same basic 
education until the age of 15, after which the study pathways begin to 
diverge. In a selective system such as this, there is no concept of 
schools responding by attempting to ‘cream-skim’ – all schools are 
selective by ability.93 
 
                                            
90 The context of the constitutional right was a long fight by the Catholic and Protestant churches to 
achieve equal funding for (religious) private schools as was given to (secular) public schools – see 
Eurydice (2006) 
91 It is, however, important to bear in mind that ‘private’ schools in the Netherlands are mostly 
religious and can be thought of as broadly similar to ‘voluntary-aided’ schools in England and Wales – 
as a condition of public funding they have to abide by the same conditions as government-operated 
schools 
92 Eurydice (2006) “The Education System in the Netherlands (2003/2004)” 
93 Although visits by officials to the Netherlands found some evidence that in some areas schools offering 
all 3 streams under one roof were in existence. There is also some degree of freedom of movement 
between different streams. 
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Chains of schools 
 
108. One interesting aspect of the Dutch education system is the 
development of large ‘chains’ of schools.94 These are often quite large - 
for example there is a Catholic school chain with more than 50 schools. 
Benefits of this noted by head teachers include: 
• economies of scale in pooling administrative functions of schools 
and managing risks of one-off expenditures, for example payments 
associated with firing poor teachers; 
• allowing school boards to hire professional specialist staff to carry 
out specialised tasks like accountancy, rather than relying on 
generalist unqualified staff to do specialised tasks; 
• allowing greater diversity in the school system – the pooled 
resources of chains allow more small schools to remain open;95and 
• allowing schools to better manage variation in enrolments. 
 
Outcomes of the education system in the Netherlands 
 
Standards 
 
109. No evaluation of the specific impact of the ‘right to supply’ on school 
standards is possible in the Netherlands as the arrangements have been 
in operation for nearly 90 years. However results from PISA 2003 are 
suggestive of relatively high standards. 
 
Segregation 
 
110. OECD research as part of the PISA study programme confirms that the 
Dutch school system has quite high levels of segregation by ability.96 
There are some concerns among policy makers that levels of segregation 
are too high, resulting in increased tension between Dutch nationals and 
the ethnic minority community.97 
 
111. It is difficult to isolate the impact of choice on this – as noted above, 
the Dutch education system is highly selective after the age of 12, which 
                                            
94 Interviews with headteachers and Government officials 
95 Although another way of looking at this is chains allow unpopular schools to remain open through 
cross-subsidisation from more popular schools 
96 See www.oecd.org/pisa  
97 Ethnic tensions, particular between Muslims and non-Muslims, have been a worry for some time for 
policy-makers in the Netherlands.  
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would be expected to have a significant impact on segregation by 
ability.98 Residential segregation also plays a very important role.99 
 
112. There are a number of policies to improve integration at national and 
local level100: 
• preventing new schools setting up with a high proportion of 
children with ‘educational disadvantages’ and forcing new 
schools to develop a ‘citizenship education’ plan; 
• encouraging local authorities and schools to make voluntary 
agreements to establish a more balanced distribution of children 
with special needs across schools and to reduce ethnic 
segregation. There is little appetite, however, for any statutory 
admissions regulation; 
• local policies aimed at reducing residential segregation (e.g. social 
housing policies) – segregation in the Dutch school system (and 
others) is largely caused by the concentration of minorities in the 
inner cities; and 
• tackling ‘white flight’ from inner city schools through, for example, 
providing academic streams in inner city schools. Currently many 
deprived areas only give students the option of attending 
vocational streams of education associated with lower 
opportunities of attending higher education. 
 
                                            
98 See papers from ESRC research project, “Measuring Markets: the Impact of the 1988 Education 
Reform Act – Gorard, Fitz and Taylor – Cardiff University School of Social Sciences 
http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/markets/, summarised in the End of Award Review (2003);  Söderström and 
Uusitalo (2005) 
99 The importance of residential segregation in driving segregation between schools in the England and 
Wales context is demonstrated by research by Gorard et al (2003) 
100 Source: correspondence with the British Embassy in the Netherlands; discussions with Dutch 
education policy-makers 
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6. DENMARK 
 
Summary  
 
• Denmark is a small country, with very low income inequality, which 
performs below average on international tests. The impact of socio-
economic status on results in Denmark is relatively low. 
 
• The Danish system is based on the principle that parents have ultimate 
authority over how their child is educated, including through home 
schooling. Independent schools can be readily approved for state 
funding with the minimum of barriers to overcome. The Danish 
independent sector is one of the most diverse in the world.  
 
• However, accountability is weak, with no formal intervention in 
underperforming schools and no performance information published for 
parents, either league tables or inspection reports. The OECD has 
highlighted this lack of accountability as a key factor explaining 
underperformance. 
 
Context 
 
113. Denmark has a population of 5.4 million with 1 million aged 0-14. 
Population density is moderate at 126 people per square kilometre: half of 
the population density in the UK. Income inequality in Denmark is one of 
the lowest in the OECD with a Gini coefficient101 of 0.23, compared to 0.33 
in the UK. 
 
114. Danish children perform below the OECD average in reading literacy 
and just above the OECD average in mathematics performance. For 
example in PISA 2000 Denmark was the 16th highest performing OECD 
country in reading literacy (the UK was the 7th).  
 
115. However the impact of socio-economic status on results in Denmark is 
relatively low compared to other countries. There is also very little 
segregation by ability between schools. For example in reading literacy, 
Denmark comes 19th out of 26 OECD countries in terms of the amount of 
variation between the average performance of different schools. Further 
                                            
101 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
 44 
details on the performance of countries in international tests can be 
found in the appendix.  
 
The Danish education system 
 
116. The Danish education system has developed on the principle that the 
parent has ultimate authority over how their child is educated and that it 
is a parental duty to ensure their child receives the best education they 
can get. In practice this means that parents have the right to teach their 
children at home or establish their own school with minimum obstruction 
from the State. Consequently the Danish independent school sector is 
acknowledged as one of the most diverse in the world, catering to a 
broad range of parental preferences.102 
 
Overview of schooling in Denmark 
 
117. Danish children generally attend combined primary and lower 
secondary schools from the ages of 7-16. 14% of the school-age 
population attend independent schools, with the Government funding 
this with a voucher to the value of 85% of the per-pupil spending in the 
State sector. Independent schools charge (unlimited) top-up fees to 
parents to make up the difference – in 2002 these were on average 
£700/year103. Danish policy-makers do not see this as a barrier to less 
well-off families choosing an independent school104, although it seems 
likely that the very worst off will be unable to exercise this choice. There 
is no admissions regulation to independent schools in Denmark – 
interviews with independent school operators suggest that some 
schools are selective by ability or social status. 
 
118. Denmark invests heavily in its education system, but Danish teachers 
are still relatively poorly qualified, especially in sciences105 and Danish 
teachers have the second lowest contact time with pupils in the OECD. 
School leaving exams are not compulsory and the accountability system 
is not developed, as explained below. 
 
 
 
                                            
102“School Choice in Denmark” – Harry Anthony Patrinos – World Bank (2001) 
http://www1.worldbank.org/education/economicsed/finance/demand/case/denmark.pdf 
103 Danish Ministry of Education 
104 Discussions with Danish education officials 
105 See OECD (2000, 2003) 
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Choice of school 
 
119. Parents are quite free to choose schools in Denmark. Interviews with 
Danish policy-makers suggest that parents generally choose on the 
basis of ‘diversity’ rather than ‘standards’, that parents do not seem to 
demand performance information about schools, and that there is little 
focus on competition between schools by head teachers. However, in 
urban areas it appears that an important factor influencing parental 
choice has been to avoid schools with a high percentage of ethnic 
minorities and low-income students.106 
 
120. There are few barriers to new independent schools setting up and to 
be approved for State funding – provided it sets up a school board, 
supplies evidence that it has suitable school premises and has the 
signatures of 40 parents who would be interested in attending the 
school. 
 
School accountability 
 
121. School accountability is comparatively weak in Denmark. 
 
Government-operated schools 
 
122. For government-operated schools, performance management is 
undertaken by the local authority, which visits schools and looks at the 
results of internal assessment tests. However, there are no formal 
sanctions imposed on under-performing schools, though the 
municipality is responsible for hiring school principals and teachers. In 
theory, the municipality can hold schools accountable for their 
performance through the performance management of head teachers (e.g. 
removing heads of poorly performing schools), though this only 
happens in extreme circumstances. 
 
Independent schools 
 
123. The only requirement on independent schools is that they offer an 
equivalent education to that provided in the State sector. They are 
expected to appoint their own external inspector (who need not be 
qualified). There are no sanctions imposed on independent schools that 
perform poorly. 
                                            
106 Discussions with Danish education officials 
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124. Consequently, parents are expected to monitor the performance of 
independent schools for their children, and withdraw their children from 
poorly performing schools. 
 
Performance information for parents 
 
125. Danish policy-makers say that there is little demand among parents for 
school performance information. In their view, the principal sources of 
information for parents is through talking to friends and neighbours and 
visiting the school to talk to their head teacher. 
 
126. No ‘league tables’ or inspection reports are published. 
 
Performance of the Danish education system and recent reforms 
 
Standards 
 
127. Poor performance in international studies appeared to come as a big 
surprise to Danish policy-makers and the Danish public, who previously 
had a lot of faith that their education system was among the best in the 
world. The OECD commenting on the results of the PISA studies note 
that: 
“Danish young people perform less well than their 
peers…underachievement occurs right across the system: there are 
fewer high-flyers, a lower average performance and a greater 
proportion of those experiencing serious difficulties than might be 
expected…in comparison with reference countries (Canada, Finland 
and the UK) and other Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden) the results 
are disappointing”.107 
 
128. The OECD highlight the lack of accountability in Denmark as a key 
factor explaining poor performance, as this means that the focus of 
schools is less on improving standards than it is elsewhere. 
 
Segregation and equity 
 
129. Evidence from international studies suggests that segregation by 
ability in the school system and equity of outcomes are close to that in 
                                            
107 “Special session of the Education Committee: Pilot review of the quality and equity of schooling 
outcomes in Demark: Examiners report” – OECD (2004) 
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the UK (although it should be noted that while the difference between 
high and low performers is similar, low performers in the UK perform at a 
far higher absolute standard). Research by Micklwright et al (2006) finds 
that social segregation (using the dissimilarity index) is lower than in 
English schools.108 
 
130. The OECD note that: 
“If the results had shown that the overall Danish average was lower 
than expected but that the usual negative relationship between 
successful outcomes and the disadvantaged backgrounds of 
students had been weakened, then it could be argued that the gain in 
equity may well have compensated for some loss of quality. The 
results, however, tell a different story: measures of both quality and 
equity are disappointing”.109 
 
Response of Danish policy-makers 
 
131. In response to concerns about standards, Danish policy-makers have 
introduced a wide-range of reforms: 
• strengthening accountability through inspection; 
• making the school leaving exam compulsory for all schools and 
distributing performance benchmarks to schools; 
• within 5-7 years all schools will have to create a website 
containing detailed information about the school (including 
performance information); and 
• new legislation enabling local authorities to distribute children 
with Danish as an additional language more equally between its 
schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
108 Micklewright et al (2006) ‘Social Segregation in Schools: How does England Compare with Other 
Countries?’ ISER Working Paper 2006-2. See the appendix for further details 
109 OECD (2004) ibid 
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7. NORWAY 
 
Summary  
 
• Norway is a highly rural country, with below average income inequality. 
Performance in international tests is mixed. Socio-economic status has 
comparatively little impact on educational attainment and segregation by 
ability is low.  
 
• The Norwegian school system is based on the principle of mixed-ability 
schooling. It is illegal to select or even set by ability. Teacher 
qualifications are comparatively low. There is a little school choice and 
the accountability system has traditionally been undeveloped. 
 
• Following their relatively poor OECD PISA results in 2000, the 
Norwegian Government introduced an extensive programme of reform to 
try to raise standards. Key elements include greater accountability 
through testing, publishing performance information and greater choice 
for parents. However, little attention was given to enabling the less well-
off to choose effectively, and the current Government has recently 
reversed some of the reforms. Other reforms have attempted to improve 
teacher training and discipline. 
 
Context 
 
132. Norway is a highly rural country with a population of 4.6 million, with 
0.9 million aged 0-14. Income inequality is below the OECD average with 
a Gini coefficient110 of 0.26, compared to 0.33 in the UK.  
 
133. Performance of Norway in PISA 2000 was mixed. The mean 
performance of Norwegian children in reading literacy was just above the 
OECD average (ranked 13th out of 27 countries) whereas the mean 
performance in mathematics was just below, ranked 16th. In the same 
tests, the UK was the 7th highest performer in reading literacy and the 8th 
in maths. 
 
134. However the impact of socio-economic status on results in Norway is 
low compared to other OECD countries. There is also very little 
                                            
110 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
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segregation by ability between schools. For example in reading literacy, 
Norway comes 17th when we rank countries by the influence that socio-
economic status has on performance (the UK is 6th). Further details on 
the performance of countries in international tests can be found in the 
appendix. 
 
The Norwegian school system111 
 
135. The Norwegian school system is based on the principle of mixed-
ability teaching. It is illegal for schools at primary and lower secondary 
level to select children by ability or to divide children into classes based 
on ability within the school. Within the confines of this framework, every 
pupil has a legal right to have teaching adapted to their abilities. The 
private sector is very small in Norway: about 2% of children are educated 
privately. 
 
136. In common with other Scandinavian countries, primary and lower 
secondary schooling is provided in the same school covering the whole 
of the age range. There are high staying-on rates for post-16 education 
(95%), with approximately half following vocational subjects and half 
following academic curricula. Due to the low population density in 
Norway, in approximately 40% of schools children are taught in mixed-
age classes. 
 
137. Teachers tend to be poorly qualified in Norway - for example, only 
80% of trainee teachers have level 2 qualifications in Norwegian and 
maths. There is little specialisation in classroom teaching before upper 
secondary level – teachers are expected to teach all subjects in the 
curriculum. 
 
138. The PISA studies note that discipline is poor in Norwegian schools – 
Norway is assessed to have the second-worst classroom discipline in 
the entire OECD. 
 
139. The State subsidises private education in a similar way to in Denmark. 
75-85% of cost of private education is met by the State with the rest 
financed by tuition fees paid by parents (which average approximately 
£100/month). To receive state funding, independent schools must teach 
the national curriculum and administer national tests. 
                                            
111 This section is based on discussions with Norwegian education officials and academics and on 
statistics obtained from the Ministry of Education and from Eurydice 
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140. There is little school choice in Norway – children are allocated to their 
nearest school. Parents can ask for their children to be put into a 
different school, but schools are under no legal duty to admit children. 
Parents can choose to go private if they can afford to pay tuition fees. 
 
141. The accountability system in Norway is undeveloped, although 
reforms are underway to improve the way in which school performance is 
assessed and to give more information to parents. 
 
Norwegian school reforms 
 
142. The relatively poor performance in the PISA examinations came as a 
surprise for Norwegian policy-makers. The response has been to put in 
place an extensive programme of reform, the “Kunskapsløftet” [Promise 
to Raise Standards]. This has concentrated on three perceived weaknesses 
of the education system: 
• basic skills: reforms to the National Curriculum, enhanced 
accountability, dissemination of best practice guidance, increasing 
the school choice that parents have; 
• teacher training: improving the training that teachers are given; and 
• discipline: tackling the poor discipline that exists in many 
Norwegian schools. 
 
Basic Skills 
 
National Curriculum focussed on basic skills outcomes 
 
143. The Government has drawn up a new National Curriculum which 
places more emphasis on basic skills and focuses on outcomes that 
should be reached at the end of each key stage of education. 
 
144. The new curriculum gives teachers more freedom over how they reach 
these outcomes, and their performance will be evaluated through a new 
testing regime. 
 
Enhanced accountability regime 
 
145. A key component of the reforms is a shift towards outcome-based 
accountability and providing greater information to parents on the 
academic performance of different schools to enhance pressure to 
improve. 
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146. It is planned for children to be tested in reading, writing, English and 
maths at ages 9, 12 and 16. The results of these tests will be 
disseminated to local authorities and schools. 
 
147. ‘Pupil inspectors’ – regular surveys of the opinions of children within 
each school about their learning environment – will be introduced. 
 
148. Parental information will be enhanced through development of a new 
on-line school information portal, ‘the School Gate’ 
(www.skoleporten.no). Policy-makers expect this will inform parental 
judgements of school quality and spark increased parental pressure for 
school improvement. It will include information on school resources, 
pupil:teacher ratios, school environment, national test results and so on. 
Some municipalities (e.g. Oslo) already collect and analyse performance 
information in this way, with ‘league tables’ of performance being 
published in the media. 
 
149. A system of ‘value-added’ data is currently in development in Norway 
to allow schools to be assessed in such a way as to take account of 
pupil background and look at performance in a fairer way that is more 
informative for parents. 
 
Increased choice for parents 
 
150. The previous Government, voted out of office in September 2005, 
introduced legislation to make it easier for (State-funded) independent 
schools to enter the school system, with the aim of utilising competition 
between schools as one lever to drive up standards. The legislation took 
effect from August 2005. 
 
151. There was no strong sense that officials and others have given much 
consdieration to issues surrounding equity – the least well-off are likely 
to be excluded from the option of choosing independent schools which 
are fee-charging. There are also no admissions regulations on 
independent schools.  
 
152. Under the reforms two key changes were made to legislation on new 
school entry to remove key barriers to entry: 
• firstly, the veto on new entry enjoyed by local authorities was 
removed; and 
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• secondly, the restriction on new schools only being allowed to 
set-up on a religious or pedagogical basis was removed. The aim 
was for independent schools in the new system to compete on the 
basis of quality to drive up standards; whereas in the existing 
system independent schools allowed parents to choose from a 
more diverse array of options. 
 
153. The new Government that took office in October 2005 was opposed to 
these choice reforms112 and committed to reversing them in their 
manifesto. They are also committed to reducing State subsidies for 
independent schools from 85% of the cost of education to 50% of the 
cost of education. Other reforms regarding curricula, teaching and 
accountability will however be carried through. 
 
Teachers 
 
154. The government is introducing a number of reforms aimed at 
increasing the quality of teachers in Norwegian schools: 
• new Academic requirements for applicants to teacher training 
programmes; 
• encouraging older applicants by introducing a fast tracking 
scheme to facilitate transition to a teaching career; 
• the possibility of introducing a requirement that all teachers 
should have a Masters degree; 
• introducing a small element of performance-related pay for 
teachers; and 
• making it easier for schools to dismiss poor teachers. 
 
Discipline 
 
155. In the PISA study, Norway was assessed to have the second worst 
disciplinary climate in its schools in the OECD (only Greece was worse). 
This has been a cause of concern among policy-makers. 
 
156. The Government views the problem as a lack of respect for teachers 
due to their low status and as a result is trying to raise the status of 
teachers. 
 
157. However, there appears to be little debate in Norway as to whether the 
cause of disciplinary problems lies deeper than this: for example, whether 
                                            
112 See http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article1178304.ece  
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the informality in the classroom, mixed-ability teaching in all subjects, 
lack of sanctions on poorly behaved children and allowing children 
almost complete freedom to do what they want has any impact in 
causing poor discipline. 
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8. FINLAND 
 
Summary  
 
• Finland is a small, ethnically homogenous country with low population 
density and low income inequality. Finland performs very well on 
international tests for standards and equity. Finland moved from a 
selective to a comprehensive school system in the 1970s. 
 
• Finland has been able to deliver good outcomes without high levels of 
accountability. There are no standardised tests, no performance 
information is published for parents, school inspections were abolished 
in 1988 and until recently there was limited school choice. 
 
• Key success factors include the fact that since the 1970s, Finland has 
insisted on all teachers having Master’s degrees. Teaching is a highly 
respected profession. High investment in Finnish schools has been 
sustained for many years. Social structures support reading. Early years 
provision is comprehensive and high-quality. Finland funds remedial 
classes for low achievers and its schools appear to deliver genuinely 
personalised learning. 
 
• Since 1998, Finns have been free to choose which school their children 
are educated in and many parents in urban areas now exercise choice. 
School inspections were only ended when the government was 
confident that teacher and school quality were uniformly high, and were 
replaced by a rigorous system of self-evaluation based on benchmarking 
against similar schools. The National Curriculum, that all schools must 
follow, sets out in great detail how schools should teach their pupils. 
 
Context 
 
158. There are about 5.2 million people in Finland.  The average population 
density is 15 inhabitants per square kilometre, around 6% of the 
population density of the UK. The population is concentrated in the 
south of the country, particularly in the Helsinki area, which accounts for 
about a fifth of the entire population. Finnish society is ethnically 
homogenous. Income inequality is one of the lowest in the OECD. The 
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Gini coefficient113 stands at 0.26, a significantly lower level of inequality 
than in the UK (0.33). 
 
159. On average, Finnish children perform very well compared with children 
in other countries. Finland was the highest performing OECD country in 
reading literacy in PISA 2000 and the 4th highest performing in 
mathematics out of 27 participating OECD countries (the UK was the 7th 
highest performer in reading and the 8th in maths).  
 
160. Finnish results in international tests are also generally characterised 
by a high degree of equity. The impact of socio-economic background 
on results was one of the lowest in the OECD in PISA 2000 and 
segregation by ability in schools also amongst the lowest in the OECD. 
However, it is interesting to note that Finland has the largest gender gap 
in literacy performance in the OECD. Further details on the performance 
of countries in international tests can be found in the appendix. 
 
The Finnish education system 
 
161. Finland adopted a ‘comprehensive’ education system in the 1970s, 
moving from a selective system where children were streamed into 
different schools at an early age based on ability. Around the same time, 
they insisted on all teachers having Master’s degrees, creating a cadre 
of expert teachers possibly unparalleled anywhere else in the world. 
 
162. There is little private education (only 2% of schools are independent) 
and these schools tend to follow the core curriculum. There are no faith 
schools. 
 
163. High investment in Finnish schools has been sustained over a long 
period of time. But spending on education is more recently is not 
significantly different to in the UK: in 2001, spending in primary and 
lower secondary education was just $400 higher (8% more spending per 
pupil). This gap is likely to have narrowed following the recent increases 
in UK education spending.114 
 
 
                                            
113 A measure of income inequality – a value of 1 indicates total inequality (one person has all the 
income); a value of 0 indicates total equality (every person has the same income). Figures from Förster 
and d'Ercole (2005) ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 
1990s’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 22. 
114 OECD Factbook 2005 
 56 
Discussion 
 
164. Some commentators have argued that Finnish success is down to the 
absence of accountability and choice. However, the successful 
outcomes in Finland are likely to be caused by a more complex interplay 
of factors than the caricature of Finland as combining low accountability 
and restricting parental choices to produce high outcomes suggests. 
 
 
Parental attitudes and the learning culture in Finland 
 
165. The Finnish Department of Education points out that a key factor 
behind the strong literacy levels is the “social structures that support 
reading” notably the “high esteem of reading in Finnish culture (homes 
subscribe to newspapers, parents read to their children at home); literacy 
as the basis for further learning is widely accepted; and the constructive 
role of the news media in creating good publicity for the promotion of 
reading and writing”115. Finnish is also a phonetic language, which 
makes it easy for children to learn. 
 
166. While children don’t start school until seven, 90% of six year-olds go 
to pre-school and 58% of three year-olds are in day care, where parents 
typically pay just 15% of the fees. Early childhood education is provided 
in these centres, but is expected to complement what is provided in the 
home.116 Finnish officials highlighted the crucial importance of early 
intervention in securing high quality, equitable schooling.117 
 
Parental choice in Finland 
 
167. After reforms in 1998, Finns are now free to choose which school their 
children are educated in. Local authorities in large cities have assisted 
the expansion of choice through shrinking school catchment areas so 
the majority of places (should schools be over-subscribed) are allocated 
on factors other than proximity to the school. Choice is now exercised by 
many parents in heavily urbanised areas of Finland – for example in 
Helsinki in 2002, approximately 50% of children entering secondary 
                                            
115 See www.edu.fi  
116 Information supplied by the embassy in Helsinki 
117 Study visit to Finland 
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schools at ages 12 and 13 requested a school other than the one they 
were allocated to.118 
 
168. However choice is only a reality in the largest cities in Finland. In rural 
areas, population density is low, providing little prospect of parents 
exercising choice. As a result, research on the impact of choice is patchy. 
However, early indications are that middle-class parents are more likely 
to exercise their choices and that popular schools manage to attract more 
advantaged pupils.119 But there is no hard empirical evidence on the 
impact choice has had on the socio-economic composition of schools or 
on standards. 
 
169. There are important differences between the choice system that exists 
in Finland and the one that exists in the UK. West et al120 note that: 
• local authorities have a lot of power over the admissions criteria 
used by schools, whereas in a third of schools in England the 
governing body of the school is the admissions authority; and 
• there is no central government regulation over the way local 
authorities fund schools – in England and Wales, 75% of funds 
must be allocated on an age-weighted per-pupil basis; local 
authorities in Finland are able to subsidise schools that are 
unpopular and ‘hold them harmless’ from the impact of parental 
choice.121 
 
Accountability in Finland 
 
170. The Central Government sets a minimum number of hours for maths 
and mother tongue teaching, a requirement recently increased (until the 
literacy hour, there was no such prescription in England). Schools are 
free to devise their curriculum within those parameters. Moreover, while 
there may be no formal SAT-like tests, there is rigorous evaluation in 
subjects like mathematics. 
 
171. Schools don’t simply rely on internal validation: they use the sort of 
benchmarking now being widely applied in English schools. The Finnish 
National Board of Education provides regular evaluation and 
                                            
118 “Market-orientated reforms and the welfare state in England and Finland: The case for compulsory 
education” – West and Ylönen – Centre for Educational Research, London School of Economics and 
Political Science (forthcoming)  
119 Ibid 
120 Ibid 
121 Experiences elsewhere (e.g. Milwaukee) suggest that if local authorities do this, the impact of choice 
on school behaviour and standards will be blunted 
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comparative data to schools, and provides standard core curricula to 
schools, although engagement in this is voluntary. 
 
172. The 320-page core curriculum for basic education not only sets out 
the essentials in each subject, it has fairly clear guidance on what should 
be done for children with special needs or those without Finnish as their 
mother tongue. That curriculum – which has legal force – also sets out 
rigid minimum teaching times in particular subjects and those hours are 
being increased.  
 
173. School inspection was phased out in 1988, and was replaced by a 
rigorous system of self-evaluation (which includes benchmarking and 
citywide evaluations in municipalities like Helsinki). The government 
apparently judged that the impact of improved teacher quality was 
coming through and teachers and schools could be trusted to get this 
right. Where schools under-perform, the city or town has money to 
intervene.122 
                                            
122 Observations from DfES study visit to Finland 
 59 
 
9. APPENDIX: INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE ON 
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 
 
There are a number of international studies that aim to provide a consistent 
comparison of educational performance of young people across countries. 
The main ones are: 
• The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is 
a three-yearly study conducted by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)123. This tests 15 year olds 
in reading, mathematical and scientific literacy.  The first PISA 
study took place in 2000 and focused mainly on reading literacy. 
The main focus of PISA 2003 was mathematical literacy. The study 
was carried out in 41 countries. Because there is no internationally 
comparable data for England in 2003 due to low response rates, 
this paper uses data from the 2000 study.124 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa   
• The Progress of International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) is 
carried out by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA)125 and tests reading literacy in ten 
year olds126. Studies are carried out every 5 years (the last one was 
in 2001). http://www.pirls.org/  
• The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study  
(TIMSS) study is also carried out by the IEA127 and tests Maths 
and Science performance in the 4th and 8th years of formal school 
(in most countries, those tested are aged 10 and 14). Studies are 
carried out every four years, with the next one due in 2007). 
http://www.timss.org/  
 
Whilst these studies are our best resource for comparing educational 
attainment on comparable and consistent basis, a number of caveats need 
to be made before drawing conclusions from results: 
                                            
123 www.oecd.org/pisa  
124 Following the results of PISA 2003, the DfES commissioned the Southampton Statistical Sciences 
Research Institute at the University of Southampton to investigate the pattern of response for England in 
2003 in order to look more closely into possible biases than was feasible when the decision to exclude 
the UK results was taken.  The report also considers the possible response bias in England in PISA 
2000. The report finds that in both 2000 and 2003 the pupils who actually took the PISA tests had 
higher mean scores than the overall target population. The authors estimate that the bias in mean scores 
would have shifted England’s position in a ranking of countries by about one place. See Micklewright 
and Schnepf (2006) “Response Bias in England in PISA 2000 and 2003” DfES RR771 
125 http://timss.bc.edu/pirls2001.html  
126 Or during the 4th year of formal schooling, whichever comes later 
127 http://timss.bc.edu/timss2003.html  
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• studies often test specific skills of children of a particular age. 
Care must be therefore taken in using such results to draw more 
generalised conclusions about the relative performance of 
different education systems; 
• there are few incentives for schools and children to do well in the 
tests – they are not held accountable on the basis of results; 
• there may be biases due to self-selection of schools and children 
who take the tests. Although survey design measures should help 
to deal with these problems; 
• tests may favour some countries over others due to the design of 
curricula; and 
• the use of rankings can potentially draw misleading conclusions 
about the relative difference in performance between countries. 
Absolute differences in results can be quite small meaning 
marginal improvements in countries’ scores can have a much 
larger effect on rankings. 
 
With these caveats in mind, this appendix looks at the relative performance 
of participating OECD countries that participated in PISA 2000. Countries 
discussed in the main paper are highlighted in black, with the UK 
highlighted in red. 
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PISA 2000 
 
Average reading literacy128 in OECD countries 
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Average mathematics129 performance in OECD countries 
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128 Reading literacy is defined in PISA as the ability to understand, use and reflect on written texts in 
order to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge and potential, and to participate effectively in 
society. 
129 Mathematical literacy is defined in PISA as the capacity to identify, understand and engage in 
mathematics and to make well-founded judgements about the role mathematics plays in an individual’s 
current and future private life, occupational life, social life with peers and relatives, and life as a concerned 
and reflective citizen. 
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Performance of the least able 5% in reading literacy 
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Performance of the least able 5% in mathematics 
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Performance of the most able 5% in reading literacy 
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Performance of the most able 5% in mathematics 
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Impact of socio-economic status on reading literacy performance  
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Impact of socio-economic status on mathematics performance130 
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130 Ibid 
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Performance of the least well-off in reading literacy131 
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Performance of the least well-off in mathematics132 
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131 Average performance of those in lower quartile in each country ranked by parental occupational status 
132 Ibid 
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Segregation between average performance of schools in reading literacy 
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Segregation between average performance of schools in mathematics 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Be
lg
iu
m
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
Po
la
nd
H
un
ga
ry
Au
st
ria
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
Ja
pa
n
M
ex
ic
o
Ita
ly
U
SA
Ko
re
a
Po
rtu
ga
l
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g U
K
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
Sp
ai
n
Au
st
ra
lia
D
en
m
ar
k
C
an
ad
a
Ire
la
nd
Sw
ed
en
N
or
w
ay
Fi
nl
an
d
Ic
el
an
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
tu
d
en
t 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 s
ch
o
o
ls
, 
ex
p
re
ss
ed
 
as
 a
 %
  
o
f 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
tu
d
en
t 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
V
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
tu
d
en
t 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 s
ch
o
o
ls
, 
ex
p
re
ss
ed
 
as
 a
 %
  
o
f 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 i
n
 s
tu
d
en
t 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 67 
Social segregation in schools (dissimilarity index)133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
133Segregation indices aim to measure the extent to which people with different characteristics are 
distributed evenly across organisational units within a specific geographical area. 
The dissimilarity index has been around for around 50 years and is defined as follows: 
 
!
=
"=
n
i
ii
B
B
A
A
D
1
5.0  
Where: 
A = The number of pupils in the minority group (FSM) in the area (Ai refers to the number of FSM 
pupils in school i) 
B= The number of pupils in the majority group (Non-FSM) in the area (Bi refers to the number of Non-
FSM pupils in school i) 
The index can lie between 0 and 1 where 0 is a completely even distribution and 1 is total segregation. 
Data from Micklewright et al (2006) ‘Social Segregation in Schools: How does England Compare with 
Other Countries?’ ISER Working Paper 2006-2. Pooled data for PISA 2000 and 2003 used.  
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